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Areentina Under the Milit?r,Y., I97f-198,3
Iqtr,odug4on
In Argentin4 duing the late 1970's the military took power in an effort to restorc
order to the country. The methods that the military employed to combat zubvErsion were
harsh, and we,re intended to complement its Proceso de Reorganizaoi6n Nacional
(Process of National Reorganization). The military's use of force in everything from
economic reorganization to social welfare programs led to a period of staggering human
fights abuses that the country is still recovering from today. This pap€r will focus on the
rise of the military and rryhat factors led to its downfall in 1983. We will see that there
was no single cause for the weakening of the military's power and the rEstoration of
dernocracy, but ttnt it was a combination of changing leadership policies, intemal
factionalisur, ffid the impossibility of turning bapk the clock to the "golden age" of
Argentina.
The Militarv
The circumstances of the military takeover of civilian government in Argentina
were not unique to this county's history, the Argentine military has always seen itself as
a tutelary institution, pesewing the traditions of the pmple and protecting them from
"degenerativeo' irfluences both within and without the county. The military saw
everything from drug addictiou and vandalism to feminism, divorce and Manrism as
subversive pathologies to be ctred from a society that had been liberalized by the
influence of the Peronist regime. Sinoe the military coup iu 1930, against Hip6lito
Irigoyen's reforms during the depressiorl Argentina has been subject to five other
successful military coups, and by 1983, with the election of the civilian Raril Alfonsin to
the presidency, had only experienced 13 years of civilian rule in the preceding 50 years.r
The Argentine military overthrew the government of Isabel Per6n, third wife of
the lale president Juan Per6q on March 24, 1976, The two years of Isabel Per6n's
government saw massive waves of strikes, work stoppages, paralyzing industial
sabotage, a huge national defrcit, an inflation rate over 500 percent, as well as the rapid
disinvestrnents by forcign investors and a severe balance of payments problem that was
crippling the Peronist regime h lgn.2 Due to increased political infighting, rampant
comrption within the governmen! Isabel Per6n's ineffectual leadership and increasing
urban guerrilla activity in protest to her government, the military once again stepped in as
the o'protector" of the stak.
Once the military assumed power, it disbanded the legislature and put the
judiciary under military conftol, while leaving the executive in a position of principal
importance. The executive branch was divided among the three branches of armed forces
in the form of a military junta of commanders-in-chief. The presidency, however, always
went to an anny offrcer, since the anny was the largest branch of the armed forces. The
intelligence service, Servicio de Inteligencia de Estado (SIDE), was under the direct
control of the president and therefore of the arny. Although members of other branches
of the service were given positions within SIDE, it remained on the whole an army
operation. As for the rest of the positions within the governmenl they were divided up
between the three branches of armed services. The exception to this was the Ministry of
1 
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Perspectives 24:6 (November 1997), 93-112.
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Economy, which included all non-military public enterprises, the Secretariat of
Commerce, Finance, Industy, and Agriculture as well as the Central Bauk, which was
the only area of government under complete civilian conkol.3
The military targeted the working classes and the bourgeoisie because they were
the mass political base of Peronism, and of the political regime that they replaced. The
military and their civilian allies blamed these classes for the chaos they inherited when
they took power from Isabel Per6n. Two main groups carried out the urban guenilla
warfare, the Montoneros, who were Peronist supporters, and the Ej6rcito Revolucionario
del Pueblo (People's Revolutionary Arrry), or ERP, wtro were of Manrist-Leninist
persuasion.a These two groups as well as sectional terrorists in the cities were
responsible for an average of three politically motivated mutders a day.s However, these
terrorist groups were largely defeated in late 1977. The military then moved on to target
other groups with the intention of subjugating through fear all those who would be most
likely to oppose the military's methods, including all non-Peronist political parties
(having already eradicated the Peronists), intellectual, legal, professional, ord human
rights groups as well as the foreign communities. This use of state terror was also
"designed to show intemational Maorism that it could and would not find fetile ground
in Argentina so long as the armed forces were able to prcvent it".5
3 Paul G. Buchanan, "The Varied Faces of Domination: Stats Terror, Economic Policy, and Social Rupture
duringtheArgentineo'Proceso," 1976-1981," AmericanJournalofPoliticalScience3L:2
(May 1987),33G382.
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The military had three main objectives in its Proceso de Reorganizaci6nNaciond
(Process of National Reorganization), or "Proceso":
(1) To eradicate Mamist subversion in all its forms from Argentine life;
(2) To restructure and stabilize the national economy in a way that would
eliminate and prevent future disruptions of the productive process and that
would make best use of those areas in which Argentina enjoyed a competitive
advantage in the world capitalist mar{<et; and
(3) Having accomplished the first two objectives, undertake a gradual, yet
profound transformation of Argentine society proper, in order to put an end to
Peronism and other comrpting influences that detracted from the taditional
values of the nation. This included a return to the traditional respect for
authority in the form of the armed forces and the Catholic Churctu and
eliminating forces seen as comrpting influences such as feminism,
nonhaditional religions and aberrant forms of axt, as well as reasserting the
proper role of men and women in the family and in society.T
Militarv Decline
The military'S downfall came not from massive opposition from without, but from
factional differences within the military itself. Disagreanents over policy and economics
within the military junta weakened the stucture of government and allowed dissent and
opposition to gain a foothold. The first five years of military rule saw solidarity and
cooperation within the armed forces. The military had a mission to fulfi1l and under
(May 1987),336-382.
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President Jorge Videla, who served from March 29, 1976 until March 29, 1981, the
military remained focused on its objective of fighting subversion and rebuilding the
economy. When Roberto Viola assumed power in 1981, divisions were starting to form
within the junta over policy and strategy in carrying out the Proceso. Viola was a
moderate who thought that it was time to start slowly bringing in the political parties and
labor unions into the forum and allow these groups to participate in some small way
before the redemocratization of the country b"g*.t Viola also inherited the economic
failures of the previous minister of economics Jos6 Alfredo Martinez de Hoz. Although
Viola named a new minister of economics, this did little to alleviate the economic crisis
and the disinvesftnents of capital in the country's econothy. Shortly after engaging in
secret talks with Peronist parties and labor gnions, with the intent of making some kind of
deal, Viola was ousted by Leopoldo Galtieri in December of 1981.
Leopoldo Galtieri had been the Army Chief-of-Staff and retained that position
after assuming the presidency in an effort to further consolidate the powers of the
executive oflice and the Army. The policies of Viola had allowed the opposition to gain
some hope and the disagreements over strategies within the military gave the opposition
the chance to consolidate their position against the govemment and its policies. [n an
effort to regain some (not even most) popular support, President Galtieri decided to rally
behind the front of national sovereignty and invade the British-conholled, but Argentine-
claimed Falkland (Malvinas) Islands in April of 1982. The general consensus within the
military was that being so small and out of the way, the British would not bother to
retaliate with a show of force to reclaim the islands. Unfortunately, this assumption was
DavidPion-Berlin,*TheFallofMilitaryRuleinArgentina:1976-l9S3",JournaloflnteramericanStudies
and World ffiirs 2l:2 (Summer 1985), 55.76.
glaringly wrong. The British did indeed respond with a strong show of force. The
reclamation of the Falkland Islands by the British was accomplished on June 14, 1982,
with the British capture of 9,800 Argentine troopr.' Any support the argentine military
had gained before the war began was quickly withdrawn when the first Argentine soldier
died. The conflict lasted seventy-two days, and the military had gained nothing but more
unpopularity and scorn from the people. The military's rnission of combating internal
warfare and subversion had failed and the military was to return to their barracks
defeated.
The military was able to hold onto power until December of 1983, when it
restored basic civil liberties and retraced its ban on political parties. It retumed power to
civilian leadership after free elections, when Ratl Alfonsin took office on December 10,
1983. The Alfonsin administation faced the difficult task of trying to redemooratize the
country after seven years of oppressive military rule. Although there was popular
support for investigating human rights violations within the population, as well as within
some sectors of the Armed Forces, hoping to reprofessionalize their image, unfortunately
for Alfonsin, his efforts to address the human rights abuses of the military were thwarted
by threats of military takeover if any members of the military were convicted. Alfonsin
did put together an inquiry boar{ the Argentine National Commission on the
Disappeared, CONADEP, irt 1984, to look into the reported disappearances of almost
10,000 people, but the inquiry had a time limit of nine months set on how long it could
continue to take reports, and there may be many more out there who might be afraid to
speak ou! or are socially or geographically isolated, and therefore may not have had the
e "Argentina Dirry War 1976-1983," Globalsecurity.org [cited June l,
2W71. <ht$://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/argentina.hun>
opporhmity to come fonvard. The estimates range from 10,000-30,000 disappeared
people in the seven years of military rule.l0 Some trial were hel{ but Alfonsin's
credibility was severely damaged with the passing of the Punta Final and Obediencta
Debida laws, which gave immunity to military officers and allowed the *I was just
following orders" excuse to become a viable legal defense.ll
The mititary di{ in fact, revolt against Alfonsin on Easter, 1987, but lacking
popular support they returned to their barracks. This signaled that it was time to hand
power over to another administration. In 1989, Alfonsfh handed presidential power over
to Carlos Menem in a peaceful artd democratic tnansfer of power on June 8, 1989.
\Yho were the victims?
The victims of the military repression included labor union leaders, teachers,
lawyers who defended victims, human rights group members, political party leaders
(especially Peronists and communists), intellectuals, students and community
organizations. The military targeted labor unions because they were seen as impediments
to the economic plans of the regime, and political parties were targeted because they had
the potential to mobilize the masses. Communists and Peronists were especially targeted
because of their strong ties to the labor movement and because the military saw them as
responsible for the chaos they had inherited when they deposed Isabel Per6n.
Intellectuals, students, teachers and community leaders were all targets for the obvious
reasons that these are groups known worldwide for their opposition to authoritarian nrle
and are also potential nests for commurrist/Marxist infiltration.
r0 Ronoldo Munck, "The Democratic Decade: Argentina since Malvinas," Bulletin of Latin American
Research, I I :2 (May 1992) 205-216.
rr Ronoldo Munch "The Democratic Decade: Argentina since Malvinas,' Bulletin of Latin American
Rese4rch, 1 I :2 (May 1992) 205.2rc.
The problems with coming up with an accurate ntrmber of victims lies in the fact
that under an oppressive regime, many records of human rights abuses were either not
kept or were destroyed beforc democracy returned in 1983. Another problem is that in
clandestinely run counter-insurgency operations the keeping of records is not the best
way of keeping secrets. While there are some records that have rtot been destoyed, as
well as testimony from some members of the military, solid facts are still hard to come by
when it comes to how many victims there actually were. The number of cremations and
the exhumation of mass graves may account for some, but it cannot account for those
who were tossed into the ocean or victims of cross-border security operations like
Operation Condor, where the governments of several L,atin American countries shared
intelligence information in an effort to murder subversives who had fled their own
countries.



















Flc' A2'-Victims of disappearance in Argentina' 1976-83 (Sikkink 1993'
Figurr 29' 421; Sk88r 1994)'
The peak period of repression took place between 1976 and 1979 urder the
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While "disappearing" was the most eornmon tactic used against prceived enemies,
murder, rape, torture and temporary irnprisonment were also used to intimidate and
coerce both real and imagined adversaries. Many detainees were kept in clandestine
prison camps, where thoy would be tortured and then murdered. Not all murders took
place in these prison camps; some victims were drugged and then thrown from planes
into the Atlantic OcearU or shot and left in the street to be presented as victims of
gfrerrilla and police shoot-outs. Some people who were arrested were detained without
being charged after being taken forcefrrlly fiom their home or workplace, and then simply
Iet go. One of the most horrendous crimes committed by the military was the kidnapping
of pregnant women. These womenos infants, if the mothers survived long enough to give
birth, were then illegally adopted by families of military personnel to be raised by the
very people who had participated in the rnurder of the child's biological parents.r2
Groups such as the Madres de Plaza de Mayo and Grandmothers of the
Disappeared gained international attention with their protests and their ongoing efforts to
find information about their loved ones. The Grandmothers of the Disappeared are still
working hard to find the missing children who were adopted out, and return them to their
biological families. These two groups are not the only ones looking for answers, but
perhaps they have the most reason to be demanding that the military be held accountable
for their actions.
Conclusion
Although the rise of the military in1976 was not necessarily unique, its downfall
was. The military regime fell not because of any organized movement by the people
12 Alison Brysh '"fhe Politics of Measuremqrt: The Contested Count of the Disappeared in Argentin4"
Human Rights Quarterly, 16:4 (November 1994), 67 6-692.
against it, but due to its own loss of vision, bad economic planning and factionalism that
developed without the leadership of Jorge Videla in the presidency. The debacle of the
occupation of the Malvinas Islands only served to further divide the armed forces, it did
not create the division.
Argentina has been moving on the path of democracy for twenty-four years now,
but there is still a lot of baggage left over &om the military regime that must be dealt
with. The search for answem about the "disappeared" continues, and until the military is
held fully accountablo for its abuses, many people in Argentina, and the world, will not
be able to move on and find closure. The process of redemocratization is ongoing; as it
moves forward, away from military intimidation, the finding of answers and healing of
wounds may move forward as well.
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